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• The Palisades Fire began in the Santa Monica Mountains and rapidly spread under strong Santa Ana winds, destroying thousands of structures and claiming at least 12 lives.

• The Eaton Fire ignited in Eaton Canyon above Altadena, and spread into foothill communities. It became one of the deadliest and most destructive in California history, with 19 confirmed fatalities, over 9,000 destroyed structures, and large-scale evacuations.

• In both fires, conditions were extreme: high winds, rapidly moving fire fronts, loss of aerial firefighting capability early on, power outages, and multiple simultaneous fire zones.

• The county commissioned after-action reviews to assess the alert/evacuation systems and decision protocols.

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Key Lessons about Evacuation from Palisades & Eaton Fires

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1. Timeliness of Alerts & Orders is Critical, but Often Delayed

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• In the Eaton Fire, many residents, particularly in west Altadena, reported never receiving alerts at the onset, or getting them only after the fire had already advanced.

• In the after-action review, it was found that during the January fires, the process to confirm and issue an evacuation notice still took 20–30 minutes (an improvement from earlier systems that took ~60 min) — but even that lag can be too slow under fast-moving conditions.

• Some evacuation zones were designated in the field, then had to be communicated to emergency operations staff and entered into digital alert systems (Genasys EVAC / ALERT). That process introduced delays.

• In the Palisades Fire, because the fire began in daylight in a region more familiar with wildfire threats, initial coordination and alerting were somewhat better “pre-positioned.” But gridlock and road congestion still impeded movement. 

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Takeaway: When fires move rapidly, every minute counts. Evacuation systems must minimize bureaucratic delay — ideally enabling frontline decision-makers to trigger alerts without many handoffs.

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2. Interagency Coordination, Clear Command Structure, and Communications Are Weak Links

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• The after-action reports noted that in both fires, agencies (fire, sheriff, emergency management) were overwhelmed, lacked unified coordination tools, and in some cases operated with unclear or outdated policies.

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• The Sheriff’s Department was hampered by an aging dispatch system, reducing situational awareness and ability to coordinate with other agencies.

• Sometimes, LASD (sheriff) staff were not always immediately aware of evacuation zone decisions made by unified command, because they weren’t co-located when decisions were made. 

• The Joint Information Center (for public messaging) was activated late in both incidents, slowing public communication. 

• Because multiple fires were igniting simultaneously across the county, resources (personnel, vehicles, communications) were stretched thin, and mutual aid lines became constrained.

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Takeaway: A robust, practiced interagency command and communication infrastructure is essential — with redundant systems, real-time info sharing, and clarity about roles. Splitting authority or delays in consensus can cost lives.

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3. Evacuation Routes & Infrastructure Limitations

• In the Palisades Fire, many roads became gridlocked. Some residents abandoned vehicles and fled on foot; bulldozers later had to clear nearly 200 stalled vehicles to make way for emergency access.

• The physical road network in many areas (narrow roads, few exits) is a known vulnerability; planners are now discussing adding or widening emergency routes. canibuild+1

• In mountainous and remote zones, access was further constrained, making sheltering or safe egress more difficult.

• Shelter accessibility was also a challenge: a recent study found significant disparities in access to shelters in the Palisades and Eaton fires, especially for isolated or mountainous communities.

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Takeaway: Evacuation planning must consider the capacity and geometry of escape routes, existing bottlenecks, and the placement and capacity of shelters. Pre-identifying alternative routes and ensuring redundancy is critical.

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4. Alert & Communication Systems Should Be Multi-Modal, Redundant, and Targeted

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• In the Palisades area, a community-based evacuation app (zone-based) was used to send geo-targeted alerts, show maps, and give guidance. That kind of tool helps bridge gaps in traditional alerting.

• However, during the fires, public alerting sometimes lagged or was inconsistent. Some residents reported that they received alerts when flames were already visible.

• Evacuation warnings and orders must be clearly differentiated, and communication must reach all channels (cell alerts, sirens, radio, door-to-door, social media). The more channels, the better chance of reaching everyone.

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Takeaway: Alert systems must be fast, reliable, redundant, and localized. Integrating newer technologies (apps, GIS-based alerts) helps, but legacy systems must not be neglected.

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5. Preplanning, Risk Awareness & Community Preparedness Matter

• The contrast between Palisades and Eaton is instructive: Palisades was more wildfire-aware and had stronger pre-positioning; Eaton struck at night in areas less accustomed to wildfire risk.

• After the Woolsey Fire, the county had already begun training, community awareness, and interagency planning, but many after-action reports say the implementation was still incomplete.

• Infrastructure changes (like road widening, alternative routes, evacuation design) had been suggested after past fires, but many were not fully realized before January 2025.

• Public education — including encouraging people to leave early, understanding evacuation zones, having “go” kits — is essential. Many people waited too long, believing they could stay or defend their homes.

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Takeaway: Preparedness before a disaster is as important as the response during it. Communities must be engaged in planning, drills, and understanding their risks.

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6. Equity, Access, and Shelter Gaps

• The sheltered capacity was insufficient in many areas, leading to disparities in who could access safe refuge, especially in remote or less advantaged zones.

• In the Eaton Fire, most of the confirmed deaths were in west Altadena — an area that received later alerts and potentially had fewer resources.

• Infrastructure or communication vulnerabilities may disproportionately affect marginalized or isolated communities.

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Takeaway: Evacuation plans must explicitly incorporate equity: ensuring warnings, transportation, shelter, and assistance reach everyone, including vulnerable populations.